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THE POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS: BEYOND
THE ABOLITIONIST PARADIGM IN AFRICA
CLAUDE E. WELCH, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: STRATEGIES AND
ROLES OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS. Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1995. xiii + 356 pp.
Reviewed by Makau wa Mutua*
INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, the subject of human rights in Africa has
become highly topical in the West primarily because of the emphasis
placed by the industrial democracies on the postwar formulation of
human rights and the universalization of its norms.' Both the United
States2 and the European Union3 have built human rights considerations
into their foreign policy frameworks. But the stuff of rights animated
Africans long before the eruption of this spate of Western interest.4
Struggles against colonial rule and current efforts to democratize the
African post-colonial state form the unbroken chain of the quest for just
* Associate Director, Human Rights Program, Harvard Law School; S.J.D., Harvard Law
School (1987); LL.M., Harvard Law School (1985); LL.M., University of Dar-es-salaam
(1984); LL.B., University of Dar-es-salaam (1983).
The author would like to thank Athena Mutua for her contribution, understanding, and
support.
1. Henkin, one of the leading academics and writers on human rights, has expressed his
belief about the importance of human rights by declaring that "[o]urs is the age of rights."
Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS ix (1990). For him, "[h]uman rights is the idea of our
time, the only political-moral idea that has received universal acceptance." Id. Alston, another
prominent academic and advocate of human rights, has argued that the designation of a
concern as a human right "elevates it above the rank and file of competing societal goals" and
provides it with "an aura of timelessness, absoluteness and universal validity." Philip Alston,
Making Space for New Human Rights: The Case of the Right to Development, 1 HARV. HUM.
RTS. Y.B. 3, 3 (1988).
2. For United States policies on human rights, see AMERICAN Ass'N FOR THE INT'L
COMM'N OF JURISTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1984); LAWYERS COMM.
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1988 PROJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1988).
3. For European Union human rights policies, see Demetrios J. Marantis, Human Rights,
Democracy, and Development: The European Community Model, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1
(1994).
4. For discussions of pre-colonial African conceptions of rights, see HUMAN RIGHTS IN
AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im & Francis M. Deng
eds., 1990) [hereinafter CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES]; Makau wa Mutua, The Banjul
Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties, 35
VA. J. INT'L L. 339 (1995) [hereinafter Mutua, Cultural Fingerprint]; Timothy Fernyhough,
Human Rights and Precolonial Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA 39
(Ronald Cohen et al. eds., 1993).
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societies. Claude Welch's important work5 explores this historical con-
tinuum and analyzes the collusion of both African and external agencies
in their attempts to rationalize the state and subject it to the interests of
the governed through the norms of the international law of human
rights.
Since the late 1980s, Africa has undergone two contradictory pro-
cesses of political transformation. Many countries have witnessed the
succession of one-party states and military dictatorships by forms of
government born out of varying degrees of open political competition,
while in others the fragmentation of political elites has led to state col-
lapse.6 These protracted problems of the post-colonial African state have
again raised questions about its viability. Analyses that purport to treat
in any serious manner the crises that wrack most of Africa must there-
fore address the foundational characteristics of the post-colonial state
and attempt to explain the seemingly permanent disjuncture between the
state and its subjects. Protecting Human Rights in Africa is the first
significant scholarly work to closely examine the roles and strategies of
non-governmental human rights organizations (NGOs) in Africa. It is
questionable, however, whether Welch's work pays adequate attention to
the nature of the post-colonial state and how its unique character has
made the quest for democracy and human rights elusive.
One source of difficulty stems from the two critical and limiting
geographic and non-thematic choices that Welch makes at the outset.
5. CLAUDE E. WELCH, JR., PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: STRATEGIES AND
ROLES OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (1995). Welch, a leading American
Africanist, is professor of political science and co-director of the Human Rights Center at the
State University of New York at Buffalo. He is chair of the African Studies Association
Human Rights Committee and has been a member of the board of directors, renamed the
advisory committee, of Human Rights Watch/Africa since its founding in 1988. His writings
in human rights include: HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA (Claude E. Welch,
Jr. & Ronald I. Meltzer eds., 1984); The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights:
A Five-Year Report and Assessment, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 43 (1992); Human Rights and African
Women: A Comparison of Protection Under Two Major Treaties, 15 HuM. RTS. Q. 549
(1993); The Organisation of African Unity and the Promotion of Human Rights, 29 J. Moo.
AFR. STUD. 535 (1991).
6. See Ali A. Mazrui, The African State as a Political Refugee: Institutional Collapse
and Human Displacement, INT'L J. REFUGEE L., Summer 1995, at 21 (1995) (Special Issue);
Makau wa Mutua, Democracy in Africa: No Easy Walk to Freedom, 2 RECONSTRUCTION 39
(1992); see generally 30 YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE IN AFRICA: THE LOST DECADES? (Peter
Anyang' Nyong'o ed., 1992).
7. See, e.g., COLLAPSED STATES: THE DISINTEGRATION AND RESTORATION OF LEGITI-
MATE AUTHORITY (I. William Zartman ed., 1995) [hereinafter COLLAPSED STATES]; Makau
wa Mutua, Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together Again: The Dilemmas of the Post-Colonial
African State, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 505 (1995) (book review); Makau wa Mutua, Why
Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1113 (1995)
[hereinafter Mutua, Redraw the Map].
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For analytical purposes he accepts, without discussion, the traditional
Africanist North Africa/sub-Saharan bifurcation. This schism, which
reflects the conventional Western division of Africa into "African" and
"Arabic," is of questionable merit in a discussion about human rights
NGOs and Africa. The separation most likely reflects Welch's own
geographic specialization; there is little evidence to suggest that human
rights NGOs ought to be treated differently on either side of the "di-
vide," although similar issues mark the two political landscapes: authori-
tarian regimes, weak civil societies, and the parallel existence of and
frictions between European legal systems and norms on the one hand
and Islamic and African heritages and values on the other.8 Significant-
ly, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) did not acknowledge this
customary dichotomy in its creation of the African regional human
rights system: the continent's human rights treaty covers the whole of
geographical Africa.9
Secondly, Welch picks four countries - Ethiopia, Namibia, Nigeria,
and Senegal - and uses their histories with NGOs to draw lessons and
conclusions about the entire sub-Saharan region.'0 The histories of most
African states are similar - generally involving European coloniza-
tion, I" despotic post-colonial states, and underdeveloped social,
8. For an illuminating history of the admixture and frictions among African, European,
and Arabic or Islamic traditions in Africa, see ALl A. MAZRUI, THE AFRICANS: A TRIPLE
HERITAGE (1986).
9. See African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc.
CABILEGI67I31Rev.5 (1981), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 59 (1982) [hereinafter African Charter].
The African Charter, which is also known as the Banjul Charter, was adopted in 1981 by the
Eighteenth Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, the official body of
African states, in Nairobi, Kenya. The African Charter's implementing body, the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, was established in 1987. Its members, who are
known as commissioners, are elected by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of
the OAU by secret ballot for a six year term and serve in their personal capacities. See id.,
arts. 31, 33, 36, 45. As of 1993, three of the eleven commissioners came from north Africa
(Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia), the rest from sub-Saharan states. See 2 REVIEW OF THE AFRICAN
COMM'N ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS iii (1994); see also WELCH, supra note 6, at 173.
10. WELCH, supra note 5, at 5-6. He argues that these countries "represent a broad
spectrum of issues and contexts." Id. at 5. He contends that their political histories, rhetorical
commitments to human rights and democracy, and their demographic and social fabrics
"represent much of the spectrum of contemporary Africa, historically, socially, economically,
and politically." Id. Evidence from the four "can be used as the basis for understanding
sub-Saharan Africa as a whole." Id.
11. Ethiopia was the only African state to escape European colonization, although it was
briefly occupied by Italy from 1936 to 1941. See IAN BROWNLIE, AFRICAN BOUNDARIES: A
LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC ENCYCLOPAEDIA 775 (1979). Liberia, another African state that was
not a colony technically, was created through the repatriation of freed Africans (primarily
former U.S. slaves) and the imposition of their rulership over indigenous Africans in the area.
See SANFORD J. UNGAR, AFRICA: THE PEOPLE AND POLITICS OF AN EMERGING CONTINENT
89-93 (1985).
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economic, and civil society sectors. Thus, in terms of human rights
questions, any four countries are likely to yield some generalizable
characteristics. However, care should be taken not project them as a
mirror for the whole region. The distinctive qualities of any four particu-
lar countries belie these similarities and make such paradigmatic selec-
tions risky. In particular, Welch's choices appear to have been primarily
influenced by his interests and focus: the pivotal nature and potential of
complex and populous Nigeria, the perceived successes of newly-
independent Namibia, Senegal's "leadership" in human rights, 2 and his
own optimistic evaluation of post-Marxist Ethiopia. In other words,
Welch chose his representative countries for their uniqueness rather than
their typicalness.
Several other assumptions underlie Welch's approach to the con-
struction of viable and just societies in Africa. Central among these is
the key role that he assigns to both domestic human rights NGOs and
international NGOs (INGOs); he sees the two as working in choreo-
graphed harmony to imbue Africans with Western liberal values as
epitomized by what he calls a "human rights culture"'' 3 and "the rule of
law.' 4 Welch dubs the 1990s as the decade of the "civil society,' 5 the
social sector that he deems critical to Africa's future. Within this sector,
as Welch notes, NGOs form a special category because they differ in
principles, membership, and goals from families and other ascriptive
12. As Welch correctly notes, Senegalese scholars and activists, led by Keba Mbaye,
were instrumental in the creation of the African human rights system. The heads of Amnesty
International, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), and the Assistant Secretary-
General of the Uhited Nations Centre for Human Rights are among the many Senegalese who
occupy important international human rights portfolios. See WELCH, supra note 5, at 164.
Welch also gives due credit to the efforts of Adama Dieng, the head of ICJ, in working with
African NGOs and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, to utilize the
strategy of "enforcement" and seek out more effective use of the reporting and individual
complaint mechanism of the African human rights system. See African Charter, supra note 9,
arts. 45, 46, 47, 55; see also WELCH, supra note 5, at 140-78 (discussing the work of the ICJ
and the African Commission).
Senegal is somewhat atypical because together with Botswana, it was the only African
country to enjoy a formal multiparty democratic system during the Cold War. In reality,
however, neither allowed real competition or the possibility of defeat to the ruling party. See
Patrick P. Molutsi, Botswana's Democracy. Past and Future Strategies, AFRICA DEMOS, Mar.
1995, at 17; see also SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN
THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 11-12 (1991).
13. WELCH, supra note 5, at 52.
14. Id. at 179.
15. Id. at 42. He argues that the emphasis on statist paradigms - strong centralized
states, leading political figures, and urban areas - in the first three decades of African
independence exposed shortcomings as states failed to meet the expectations of the people. Id.
As a result, the focus in the 1990s has shifted to the "grassroots," the civil society, which is
expected -to tame the despotic state and help release the energies of citizens to reverse
Africa's downward spiral. Id.
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groups; they do not involve themselves directly in markets and are
distinct from government institutions although they interact with the
state.' 6 According to Welch, human rights NGOs occupy an even more
hallowed plane:
They [human rights NGOs] seek to benefit society, or at least a
significant portion. of it, without necessary direct benefit to them-
selves. They constitute both a precondition for, and a supplement
to, the constitutionally defined political process and the formal
political bodies of the democratic state. As voluntary organizations
in large measure, they often pursue idealistic causes. But these
causes are crucial to the functioning of a modem society.' 7
As one of the many competing political forces in society, do NGOs
and what Welch calls the "NGO revolution"' 8 deserve such reverence?
Welch's first two chapters, which contextualize the often serious human
rights problems in the four selected countries, cast human rights NGOs
as saviors. Welch identifies six basic strategies that he believes NGOs
utilize to improve the lives of individuals and groups and answers that
question in the affirmative. 9 Each of the six strategies - education,
empowerment, enforcement, documentation, democratization, and devel-
opment - is the basis of a chapter in Protecting Human Rights in
Africa. In each, Welch focuses on particular states and NGOs and at-
tempts to explain how the strategy works; he analyzes issues that arise
in pursuit of the strategy, collaboration with other entities (domestic and
international), and evaluates the status of the project. The last chapter is
devoted to the celebration of the human rights NGO, although it also
assesses resource constraints, organizational, difficulties, interference by
the state, and consequences of external funding.
In this review, I critically examine the meaning of what Welch calls
the "NGO revolution" in the area of human rights in Africa and assess
the claims that he makes against the political and social problems that
the continent continues to face. I probe in particular the purposes and
methodologies of the international human rights project and seek its
relevance to Africa. The questions I pose2' include: the character of the
16. Id. at 44.
17. Id. (footnote omitted).
18. Id. at 45.
19. In the conclusion of his book, Welch elucidates his belief in the centrality of human
rights NGOs. See WELCH, supra note 5, at 284-317.
20. I briefly explored some of the difficulties I discuss here in an earlier piece. See
Makau wa Mutua, Domestic Human Rights Organizations in Africa: Problems and Perspec-
tives, 22 ISSUE 30 (1994) [hereinafter Mutua, Domestic NGOs].
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values and programs advocated by Welch and other believers of univer-
sal human rights discourse; the tensions between the particularities of
cultural Africa and the global liberal agenda of human rights; the often-
competing roles of Africans and non-Africans in the struggle against
human rights problems; and the viability of the post-colonial state in the
reconstruction of African societies.
In Part I of this review, I probe the historical and cultural bases for
the human rights corpus, and attempt to demonstrate the "ideological"
character of that corpus. This critique of human rights norms, which
Welch does not explicitly address, seeks to situate the "political" context
in which Protecting Human Rights in Africa examines the spread of a
"human rights culture." In Part II, I critically explore the strategies
employed by human rights NGOs in the diffusion of Western liberal
values. In particular, I examine the tensions within the movement be-
tween African NGOs and their "friends" in the North and the implica-
tions of those tensions to the creation of a viable NGO community in
Africa. Finally, I evaluate the basic mission of human rights NGOs in
view of the problems of the viability of the African post-colonial state.
I. CULTURAL BIAS AND THE LIBERAL PROJECT
The principal purpose of Protecting Human Rights in Africa appears
not to have been a probing exploration of philosophical and cultural
tensions that mark the human rights enterprise. Rather, Welch takes as a
given the normative superiority of the human rights corpus over other
moral and rights claims and other traditions that stand outside that cor-
pus. He draws a rigid and sharp contrast between the human rights
regime on the one hand and "traditional" and "non-Western" norms and
practices on the other. From this basic premise, he treats as an irritation
any suggestions that have the potential to detract from the "universality"
of human rights - hence, the cursory and perfunctory look that he
gives the controversy. His celebration of universality and dismissal of
countervailing arguments are unremitting:
The "international bill of rights" had its origins in the West, but it
is not an unmitigated imposition of alien values on other societies.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is now far more global
in its reach and recognition .... The once-flourishing academic
enterprise of ferreting out human rights protection in "traditional"
African cultures and of arguing there was no need for even the
modest claims of the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights has shriveled, though not disappeared. I regard the muting
of debate over the source and content of rights as a significant
[Vol. 17:591
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advance. In a sense, the relative silence over domestic sovereignty
and cultural relativism is eloquent testimony to the spread of uni-
versal human rights ideals.2
Welch's view, which seems to treat with suspicion any non-Western
critique of human rights, particularly as to its content, cultural relevance,
and ranking of rights, is dominant among Western scholars and activists.
Contrary to this view - I concede here the rhetorical acceptance of
human rights norms by states of all major cultural blocs and traditions
- the most vocal debates in human rights today rage over the cultural
basis22 for human rights; their ideological and political dimensions and
deployment;23 and thematic incompleteness.24 Some leading Western
advocates of human rights have conceded openly that the West "im-
posed" its own philosophy of human rights on the rest of the world.25 It
is therefore somewhat surprising for Welch, who has substantial knowl-
edge of Africa and is regarded as an authority, to show reluctance to
validate this debate.26
21. WELCH, supra note 5, at 289.
22. For discussions about cultural dimensions and tensions in human rights, see HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS (Abdullahi Ahmed
An-Na'im ed., 1992) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS]; CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 4; JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1989);
HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Adamantia Pollis & Peter
Schwab eds., 1979); Raimundo Panikkar, Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?,
DIOGENES, Winter 1982, at 75.
23. See, e.g., Bilahari Kausikan, Asia's Different Standard, 92 FOREIGN POL'Y 24 (1992);
Thomas Carothers, Enlarging Democracy: Democracy and Human Rights, CURRENT, Nov.
1994, at 17; see also CHANDRA MUZAFFAR, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER
(1993); Henry J. Richardson III, Book Review, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 852 (1994) (reviewing
CHANDRA MUZAFFAR, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER (1993)).
24. See; e.g., ERIC HEINZE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION: A HUMAN RIGHT (1994); Karen
Engle, International Human Rights and Feminism: When Discourses Meet, 13 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 517 (1992); Melissa Thorme, Establishing Environment as a Human Right, 19 DENY. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 301 (1991).
25. See Antonio Cassese, The General Assembly: Historical Perspectives 1945-1989, in
THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 26, 31 (Philip Alston ed., 1992) [hereinafter
UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS]; see also Virginia Leary, The Effect of Western Per-
spectives on International Human Rights, in CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4,
at 15.
26. Welch briefly discusses the conflict between cultural relativism and universalism in
relation to the narrow mandate of Human Rights Watch (HRW), the largest American based
INGO, and the credibility of its work in Africa. HRW focuses exclusively on civil and
political rights, or so-called first generation rights. He discusses this tension in the context of
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, the executive director of HRW/Africa from 1993 to 1995 and
now a professor at Emory University School of Law. An-Na'im, a Sudanese Islamic scholar,
has written extensively on human rights and Islam from a reformist perspective. Although a
firm believer in the need for universality, An-Na'im thinks that cultural legitimacy is neces-
sary in the construction of a viable human rights corpus. See WELCH, supra note 5, at 221.
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The quest for an international consensus on human rights is likely to
be rendered more elusive by insistence on the part of Western academics
and activists that the essentially European formulation of human rights
trumps all other non-Western conceptions of the relationships among
individuals, the community, and the state. Rather than launch immedi-
ately into discussions about the internationalization of human rights
norms through NGOs, Welch could have presaged his work with analy-
ses of the meaning of the "culture of rights" crusade,27 the tensions that
attend that project, and the merits and demerits of opposing views. An
understanding of -the origin, purpose, and political character of the
human rights movement is therefore essential in forming views about
their utility in the African context.
Although the human rights corpus did not spring into being until
after World War II, its philosophical foundations had been under evolu-
tion over several centuries in Europe and the United States. As Donnelly
has correctly argued, conceptions of individual rights against the state,
the pivot of the human rights regime, are traceable to the roots of liber-
alism and its early thinkers.2" The more "radical" strand of liberalism
limits emphasis on the individual and stresses a more social vision, but
it is the conventional strand's individualism that has dominated the
formulation of the human rights corpus. 29
This individualist focus, which emphasizes civil and political rights
and utilizes the "negative" or hands-off claims against the state, is es-
poused by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)30 and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),3'
which are generally regarded as the two most important human rights
He has noted, for example, that "the merits of a reasonable degree of cultural relativism are
obvious, especially when compared to claims of universalism that are in fact based on the
claimant's rigid and exclusive ethnocentricity." Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Toward a
Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of Human Rights: The Meaning
of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, in HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
22, at 19, 25.
27. Recognition of the possible limits of the human rights project is essential given the
critiques of earlier Western crusades, such as the law and development movement of the
1960s and 1970s. That movement, which was not dissimilar from the "rule of law" emphasis
of the human rights movement, emphasized the use of law as a tool for social change.
28. See generally Jack Donnelly, Human Rights and Western Liberalism, in
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 31.
29. Id. at 33; see also Mutua, supra note 4, at 341.
30. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (II1), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
183d mtg. at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
31. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 2, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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instruments.32 The UDHR occupies a commanding station in human
rights law33 in spite of its animation by distinctly European philosophi-
cal constructs.34 These two instruments attempt the universalization of
civil and political rights, the basic freedoms on which Western liberal
democracies are founded. Group rights - such as the right to develop-
ment 35 or economic, social, and cultural rights - form an essential part
of the corpus of human rights, but they belong to a lower order in terms
of their rhetorical importance, -scholarly prominence, and activist empha-
sis. 36 Despite the protection of some economic, social, and cultural rights
by the UDHR37 and the recognition by the ICCPR of the group right to
self-determination, 38 this class of rights is not the focus of activist or
scholarly emphasis. As a result, these rights remain highly underdevel-
oped and subordinated to the individualist idiom of human rights dis-
course.39
In this review, I argue that most Western human rights advocates
and-scholars, including Welch, consciously or unconsciously see democ-
32. Steiner calls the UDHR the "spiritual parent" of many of the human rights treaties.
Henry J. Steiner, Political Participation as a Human Right, 1 HARV. HUM. RTS. Y.B. 77, 79
(1988).
33. The UDHR was adopted by a vote of 48 to 0 with 8 abstentions. At the time, the
United Nations was dominated by the West because Africa and most of Asia were colonies.
See Cassese, supra note 25, at 31.
34. As Henkin, one of the leading American scholars on the subject, notes:
International human rights derive from natural rights theories and systems, harking
back through English, American, and French constitutionalism to John Locke et al.,
and earlier natural rights and natural law theory. In its, American version, that
constitutionalism included concepts of original individual autonomy translated into
popular sovereignty; of a social compact providing for continued self-government
through accountable representatives; of limited government for limited purposes;
and retained, inalienable, individual rights.
HENKIN, supra note 1, at 6 (citation omitted).
35. The United Nations Gerieral Assembly recognized the right to development in 1987.
See Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/41/128 (1987). The right to development was highly influenced and popularized by
Keba Mbaye, the Senegalese jurist. See WELCH, supra note 5, at 274.
36. These "lower" rights are the subject of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, the third of the three human instruments that form the so-called
"international bill of rights." See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 [hereinafter ICESCR].
37. See UDHR, supra note 30, arts. 22-29.
38. The ICCPR and ICESCR have an identical article-one, which recognizes the right to
self-determination. See ICCPR, supra note 31, art. 1; ICESCR, supra note 36, art. 1.
39. Alston has correctly noted that with the exception of some labor-related rights,
second and third generation rights - such as the right to education, health, food, and
environment - are normatively underdeveloped because, unlike civil and political human
rights, they are not based on any significant body of jurisprudence. Such jurisprudence is
sketchy at best. See Philip Alston, The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
in UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 473, 490.'
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racy as the only political system in which human rights norms are
readily realizable. As a consequence, many see the establishment of
Western-style institutions and structures as indispensable to the rule of
law and respect for human rights. Thus, these scholars advocate the
need for competitive political systems, media free of government con-
straints, autonomous citizens' groups and professional and trade associa-
tions, legal systems anchored in an independent judiciary, and free-
market organizational structures if human rights goals are to be realized.
This view, I contend, is the deliberate or unwitting political agenda of
the human rights movement. Like many other human rights advocates,
Welch does not explicitly subscribe to this line of thinking, but the
societal arrangements that he proposes and the roles that he carves out
for human rights NGOs fit this pattern.
Henkin has argued that the human rights corpus requires no particu-
lar form of government and does not advance any "comprehensive
political theory." 4 But he concedes that "the idea of rights reflected in
the instruments [i.e., human rights], the particular rights recognized, and
the consequent responsibilities for political societies, imply particular
political ideas and moral principles. 41 I agree with Henkin that the
corpus does not dictate the exact form of government a state must take,
but I believe that read as a whole, human rights law requires variations
of liberal democracy. The political participation clause of the ICCPR
seems to point in this direction: it gives every citizen the right "[t]o vote
and be elected at genuine periodic elections" through "universal and
equal suffrage" and by "secret ballot" to "guarantee[] the free expression
of the will of the electors. 42 Steiner's pioneering article on the right to
political participation analyzed in depth the meaning of this provision in
the context of diverse political systems. He concluded that while the
provision did not impose a particular ideology, the open political de-
mocracies of the industrial states seemed best suited for achieving its
political participation goals.43
Political participation, as envisaged in the human rights instruments,
requires the guarantee of other freedoms such as the right to assemble,
associate, and disseminate ideas." These guarantees appear to imply a
typology of government that allows open political competition for office
and a free press. As Steiner has forcefully stated, "these participatory
40. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 6.
41. Id. at 7.
42. ICCPR, supra note 31, art. 25(b).
43. See generally Steiner, supra note 32.
44. ICCPR, supra note 31, arts. 18, 19, 21, 22, 25.
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norms clearly rule out the forceful imposition of any one ideology.
45
He concludes that:
They [participatory norms] rule out such forms of government as
dictatorships and inherited leadership. Most one-party states
would violate provisions on association and pluralist participa-
tion, although some could meet generous interpretations of these
ambiguous requirements through extensive intra-party demo-
cracy.
46
Welch shows his awareness of the relationship between political
democracy and human rights NGOs by prefacing Chapter 8 - on
democratization and the search for civil society in Nigeria - with a
reproduction of Article 25 of the ICCPR. He identifies the two somewhat
complementary political forces which sought the introduction of political
democracy in Nigeria.47 Both sought in their different ways to orchestrate
political democracy in Nigeria through the deployment of human rights
discourse. The first was the government-created Centre for Democratic
Studies (CDS), which Welch generously calls a government-organized
non-governmental organization (GONGO).48 Omo Omoruyi, a respected
political scientist, was its director.49 Its purpose was to teach democratic
attitudes, methods, and strategies to the two sole political parties: the
National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party
45. Henry J. Steiner, The Youth of Rights, 104 HARV. L. REV. 917, 930 (1991).
46. Id. at 930-31. On the other hand, Steiner argues that although participatory norms
leave open the balance of the distribution of power in the state - as, for example, between the
majority and ethnic or other minorities - they permit political arrangements for unitary or
federal states, parliamentary or presidential systems, and bicameral or unicameral legislatures,
among others. Id. For views that identify political democracy with the human rights corpus, see
generally Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE
J. INT'L L. 539 (1992); Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance,
86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992).
47. Nigeria has been ruled almost exclusively by military dictatorships since independence
from Britain in 1960. See Anthony Goodman, UN Panel Condemns Nigeria Executions, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Dec. 15, 1995, at 44. The country's latest troubles heightened in 1993 when
General Ibrahim Babangida, who had seized power in a military coup in 1985, annulled the
June 1993 presidential elections believed to have been won by Moshood Abiola. Human rights
groups, pro-democracy activists, and Abiola's supporters organized demonstrations and strikes
to protest the cancellation of the vote. In the ensuing crisis, General Sani Abacha took control
of the government and has carried out a severe and brutal crackdown on the opponents of the
regime. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1995
34-39 (1994); WELCH, supra note 5, at 20-28; Oji Umozurike, Nigeria and the African
Charter, CONST. RTS. J., Jan.-Mar. 1995, at 36.
48. At best, CDS should perhaps be classified as a quasi-governmental institution due to
its creation, sponsorship, and close association with the military junta in Nigeria. As put by
Welch, the role of the CDS was "to create a behavioral foundation for democracy among party
officials and candidates." WELCH, supra note 5, at 239.
49. In 1995, Omoruyi left Nigeria after an attempt on his life. He is now a visiting fellow
at the Harvard Law School Human Rights Program.
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(SDP), both government-created. The SDP, "a little to the left of center,"
and the NRC, "a little to the right of center," would be financed by the
state and have no ethnic, regional, sectional, or religious biases, cleavag-
es that the military felt had doomed earlier attempts at democratization.50
This bizarre attempt to engineer an American-style political system
reflected, at least in part, the association of Western political democracy
and the human rights norms pertinent to political participation. This
"democratization from above" was challenged by efforts at democratiza-
tion from below in the form of a second force, which was composed of
human rights NGOs, some trade unions, and several professional associ-
ations organized collectively under the name Campaign for Democracy
(CD). 5' Soon after the annulment of the 1993 vote, the CD was success-
ful in mobilizing mass support against the regime, but differences in
strategy ultimately caused CD to collapse. 52 TheAbacha regime moved
quickly to disband the NRC and SDP, sideline the CDS, and carry out a
widespread campaign of persecution against the CD and other opponents
of the regime. Welch attributes this failure of democratization to the
reluctance of the military to relinquish power, but he neglects to address
the critical issue of the difficulty of democratizing a state where the elites
have fragmented along regional and religious lines and cannot agree
upon the rules of political competition and the orderly transfer of power.
This difficulty is the vexing problem of the African post-colonial state.53
The linear universalization of the liberal values sought by the human
rights movement appears to have been halted, at least in the near term,
by the inviability of the post-colonial state. Namibia54 is an exception. To
50. Id. at 24. Officials associated with former governments were barred from seeking
political office on party tickets. Id.
5 1. See id. at 252.
52. Id. at 253-54.
53. See Marina Ottaway, Democratization in Collapsed States, in COLLAPSED STATES,
supra note 7, at 235; see generally Mutua, Redraw the Map, supra note 7.
54. Welch's analysis and description of Namibia's fledgling experiment with political
democracy since its hard-won independence from South African apartheid correctly captures
the success of that experiment, particularly the state's tolerance of political dissent and
opposition and its open and respectful attitude toward human rights NGOs and the press. See
WELCH, supra note 5, at 15-20, 179-97, 214-16. However, this seemingly successful start with
the establishment of a "human rights culture" masks the inability of the state to transform the
legacy of apartheid and its gross economic and social inequalities. See Denis Herbstein, Jobs
and Land, AFR. REP., July-Aug. 1993, at 52. This numbing fact postpones Welch's character-
ization of Namibia's "success of a color-blind, democratic, and developing society [that] can
teach a lesson to the world, and in particular to neighboring South Africa." WELCH, supra note
5, at 16. While Namibia's political trajectory is encouraging, the fortunes of its black majority
remain bleak, not unlike those of several other post-independent "success" stories such as
Zimbabwe or, as many in the West thought during the Cold War, Kenya.
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some extent, so is Senegal.55 Both countries seem to have defied the most
crippling effects of this syndrome. However, most African countries,
including Ethiopia, are caught in the quandary. The current government
of Ethiopia, which came to power in 1991 after militarily defeating
Mengistu Haile Mariam's Derg, has implemented an exclusionary "democ-
ratization" process.56 Major opposition groups have been excluded by
government harassment or have stayed out after failing to influence the
nature of the transitional process. 57 The Tigrayan-controlled Ethiopian
government, wary of past Amhara domination, has reverted to the
manipulation of ethnicity to retain control. Although his description of
political events is accurate, Welch fails to probe the government's refusal
to compete politically; he accepts too easily the government's formal
commitment to democratization." Once again, the failure of the democrat-
ic project in Ethiopia points to the difficulties of democratization without
55. In the case of Senegal, Welch should have been more wary of its formal democracy,
a system that has not permitted any real competition for public office, as demonstrated by the
flawed presidential vote in 1993. See Peter da Costa, All the President's Men, AF. REP.,
Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 64. The state's repression of demands for self-determination or regional
autonomy for the Casamance region further indicates the limits of its "democracy." See WELCH,
supra note 5, at 28-34, 124-31.
56. In 1991, the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Ethiopian Peoples
Liberation Democratic Front (EPRDF), a collection of ethno-military movements organized and
dominated by the Tigrayan Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLF), and the Oromo Liberation Front
(OLF), overthrew Mengistu Haile Maiiam's seventeen-year rein of terror. The EPLF proclaimed
Eritrea's sovereign independence from Ethiopia, and the EPRDF and the OLF formed the new
government in Ethiopia. Prior to the June 1992 regional elections, disagreements between the
EPRDF and the OLF led to military clashes between the two, the defeat of the OLF, and its
exit from government. Other opposition groups left or were expelled from the government,
leaving the TPLF in contiol. The government has since engaged in widespread repression of
political dissent, the media, and critical human rights groups. In May 1995, the hand-picked
leaders of the TPLF overwhelmingly won the national elections, officially completing the
transitional process. All major opposition groups boycotted the elections. See generally Ottaway,
supra note 53, at 235; Edmund Keller, Remaking the Ethiopian State, in COLLAPSED STATES,
supra note 7, at 125; Makau wa Mutua, An Oppressed Opposition, AFR. REP., Nov.-Dec. 1993,
at 50; Makau wa Mutua, The New Oligarchy, AFR. REP., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 27; Makau wa
Mutua, The Regionalization Controversy, AFt. REP., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 30; Makau wa Mutua,
Democracy's Bid Fades in Ethiopia, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 18, 1992, at 19; Makau
wa Mutua, Ignoring the Lessons of History: Ethnocracy and Human Rights Violations in
Ethiopia, ETHIOPIAN REV., Dec. 1994, at 23; Makau wa Mutua, Anointed Leadership, AF. REP.,
Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 30; see also TECOLA W. HAGOS, DEMOCRATIZATION?: ETHIOPIA
(1991-1994), A PERSONAL VIEW (1995); INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP,
ETHIOPIA IN TRANSITION: A REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1994).
57. See Tsegaye Tadesse, Opposition Parties Routed in Ethiopian Election, Reuters, May
10, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
58. The divisions and the political incoherence among opposition groups is no reason to
give the benefit of doubt to the government. Some academics, such as Marina Ottaway, have
been more critical. She has accused the government of failing to compete and dividing Ethiopia
into "strangely shaped ethnic regions, the equivalent of the South African homelands." Ottaway,
supra note 53, at 238.
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the contemporaneous reformulation of the state to bequeath it with
viability.
II. NGO STRATEGIES, DEPENDENCE, AND ABOLITIONISM
The phenomenon that is known as human rights is a movement, not
a monolith; within it there is a wide and contrasting variety of organiza-
tions, norms, processes, institutions, goals, and motives. At their barest,
the movement's norms seek the imposition of limits on state action against
the individual. However, that scope has expanded to require "positive"
action by the state to lead the struggle to eliminate conditions that foster
poverty, exclusion, discrimination, and other forms of powerlessness. In
the hands of individuals and organizations, these norms become weapons,
materi6l for battle, legitimating bases for their causes. Reduced to its bare
bones, the human rights corpus is the handmaiden of political operatives.
Many media and agencies are deployed in the transmission and
inculcation of human rights norms. Chief among these is the United
Nations, the body whose imprimatur the human rights instruments bear.
Within the United Nations, there is a maze of smaller bodies and commit-
tees - official guardians - whose purpose it is to seek the creation,
dissemination, and enforcement of human rights norms. Outside this
"official" chamber is the second layer, the "private" realm, arguably the
most important component of the human rights movement, on which the
success of the movement depends. Since the target of the corpus is
primarily the state, it is reasonable to suppose that human rights NGOs,
the private citizens' groups, are indispensable in holding the state to its
obligations. It is these groups that form the centerpiece of Protecting
Human Rights in Africa.
Welch examines the roles of both national NGOs as well as those
organizations whose mandates reach beyond national borders, the INGOs,
in their efforts to spread a "human rights culture" in Africa. He explores
the strategies employed by both types of organizations and advocates close
cooperation between them, although he does not discuss the complexities
that mark their relationship. The history and the role of INGOs in defining
the character of the human rights movement and its corpus are central to
understanding the internationalization of the human rights movement in
general and its penetration of Africa in particular.59 As a basis for discuss-
ing the work and styles of human rights NGOs in Africa, Welch should
have paid particular attention to the contours of this relationship because
59. See generally Mutua, Domestic NGOs, supra note 20.
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the importance of these organizations cannot be overstressed; they seek
to affect the fundamental character of the society and the state.
INGOs are based almost exclusively in the West even though the bulk
of their work is directed at the South. Steiner aptly captures the distinction
between so-called "First World" NGOs, which includes INGOs, and
"Third World" national NGOs:
In a nutshell, "First World" NGOs [both NGOs such as the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and INGOs such as HRW] means
those committed to traditional Western liberal values associated with
the origins of the human rights movement. Many of these NGOs
work exclusively within their home countries, but the "First World"
category also includes most of the powerful international NGOs that
investigate events primarily in the Third World.60
INGOs are the ideological offspring of Western domestic NGOs such
as the ACLU and the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP), including the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund (LDF). Although the NAACP has also focused on
questions of social and economic justice, both organizations rest their
moral authority on a narrow range of civil and political rights.6 None
challenge or question the fundamental character of economic or social
structures and their underlying philosophies and assumptions; they seek
fair and equal treatment within the framework of the American liberal
market economic arrangements. Leading INGOs such as HRW,62 Amnesty
International (AI),63 and ICJ64 promote similar ideals abroad.
Individuals connected to the ACLU have been prominent in the
formation and development of American INGOs. Roger Baldwin, the
founder of the ACLU, also founded the International League for Human
60. HENRY J. STEINER, DIVERSE PARTNERS: NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE
HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT 19 (1991).
61. The ACLU was founded in 1920 to advocate the rights of conscientious objectors and
today sees itself as the defender of the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution. See
NORTH AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS DIRECTORY 19 (Laurie S. Wiseberg & Hazel Sirett eds.,
1984) [hereinafter NORTH AMERICAN DIRECTORY]. The NAACP was founded in 1909 to seek
equal treatment for African-Americans. Id. at 161.
62. HRW works to defend "freedom of thought and expression, due process and equal
protection of the law." See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 47.
63. Amnesty International defends basic civil and political rights in the context of
"prisoners of conscience," a term for individuals detained for their beliefs, ethnic origin, sex,
color, or language, provided the prisoners have not advocated or used violence. See Statute of
Amnesty International, arts. 1, 2, reprinted in 1995 AMNESTY INT'L REP. 327 (1994).
64. The Geneva-based ICJ was formed in 1952 as a tool for the Cold War with the support
of the American CIA to advocate the rule of law. See WELCH, supra note 5, at 163.
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Rights (ILHR) in 1942.65 The ILHR in turn founded the New York-based
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, another important American
INGO. Human Rights Watch, the dominant American INGO, was started
in 1978 with the founding of Helsinki Watch. It was developed into
prominence by Aryeh Neier, a former executive director of the ACLU. 6
Amnesty International, the world's most famous INGO, was started in
London in 1960 by Peter Benenson, a British lawyer concerned with the
civil liberties of those persecuted because of their opinions or beliefs. 67
In the last half century INGOs such as these have formed the heart and
soul of the human rights movement, its engine of growth. They, more than
any other groups, have set the agenda and scope of the worldwide human
rights movement.
INGOs and their domestic American predecessors are trend-setters in
the universe of human rights; it is difficult to understand human rights
NGOs in the South without exploring the historical evolution and the
strategies deployed by their Northern counterparts. The "leadership" of
INGOs in human rights derives in large measure from the circumstances
of their origin: the underlying values of the human rights movement are
Western in orientation and arise from the history of the relationship
between the state and the individual; INGOs benefit from the reservoir of
experience accumulated by civil society organizations in the North; the
freedoms and latitude were "captured" from the state by civil society
organizations in industrial democracies; they derive financial, social, and
moral support from philanthropists, foundations, and citizens; they enjoy
access to "world" political centers such as New York, London, Washing-
ton, Paris, and Geneva; they utilize the resources and ability of United
Nations and regional human rights systems; they have access to the
all-powerful Western media; and they have access to and, quite often,
cooperation from the arms of government concerned with foreign affairs.
In contrast, even the most visible human rights NGOs in the South operate
at the bare margins of these structures.
In many cases, human rights NGOs in the South have been orches-
trated by NGOs and foundations from the North. The Legal Resource
Centre, one of South Africa's leading human rights law firms, was
founded with the support of Jack Greenberg, former director-counsel of
65. See NORTH AMERICAN DIRECTORY, supra note 61, at 135-36.
66. See Aryeh Neier, Political Consequences of the United States Ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1233, 1233 (1993).
67. Ian Martin, The New World Order: Opportunity or Threat for Human Rights, Address
Before the Harvard Law School Human Rights Program 4-5 (April 14, 1993) (published by
Harvard Law School Human Rights Program) (on file with Michigan Journal of International
Law).
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LDF. 6' The Ford Foundation been one organization which has provided
crucial financial support for countless human rights NGOs in the South.69
As this author has argued elsewhere, these relationships translate into
"copycat" human rights NGOs in Africa:
Many of the new groups [human rights NGOs] were orchestrated,
funded and supported or at the very least deeply influenced by
individuals, human rights organizations, and foundations from the
North. It is little wonder that most African human rights organiza-
tions echo Al, HRW and ICJ in mandate, structure and methods of
work. They monitor, document and publicize human rights conditions
A la Al and HRW. But they also train paralegals and carry out
educational and rights awareness campaigns such as those promoted
by the ICJ. Many of them are miniature replicas of their more
powerful counterparts in the North: they are funded by the same
sources, they are organized similarly with almost identical mandates
and use similar tactics and strategies of advocacy and work.70
The implications of this dependent relationship often mean that
African human rights NGOs cannot freely pursue their own agendas or
survive over the long term, problems that Welch identifies.7' More
seriously, African NGOs run the risk of downgrading economic and social
rights and the structural problems that are the root causes of human rights
abuses if they draw too much from INGOs. 72 Welch recognizes the danger
of this lopsided approach and devotes Chapter 9 to a discussion of the role
that human rights NGOs can play in the quest for economic and social
rights. He correctly argues that human rights will remain elusive unless
underdevelopment in rural Africa, where the majority of the people live,
is overcome.73 He decries the emphasis which powerful human rights
NGOs place on urban areas at the expense of "development" organizations
which operate in the countryside.
68. See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW AROUND
THE WORLD 1 (1992).
69. See generally 1994 FORD FOUND. ANN. REP. (1995).
70. Mutua, Domestic NGOs, supra note 20, at 31.
71. See WELCH, supra note 5, at 294, 303. 1 have concluded elsewhere that "[t]here is no
future for the human rights movement in Africa unless it can secure domestic ideological,
financial and moral support from interested constituencies. An externally funded and directed
movement cannot address the needs of Africans much less be integrated into the fabric of
society." Mutua, Domestic NGOs, supra note 20, at 32.
72. For an excellent discussion of the mandates of INGOs and their critiques by activists
from the South, see STEINER, supra note 60, at 17-39.
73. WELCH, supra note 5, at 265.
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Welch admires "pioneer" activists such as Molly Melching, a former
American Peace Corps volunteer, who returned to a Senegalese village to
start an "enabling" and "empowerment" program.74 The program is built
around teaching basics - reading, writing, and farming - to Senegalese
villagers through their own language and culture. The externally-funded
program was intended to combat discriminatory gender attitudes and
poverty and to increase rights awareness. Although Melching's program
arguably has merit, the image of Americans "teaching" Africans their own
culture is disturbing to the extent that it encourages external dependence
and creates the impression of whites "rescuing" hapless Africans. In any
event, it is doubtful whether externally-funded programs are the answer
to Africa's "rural problem." Genuinely empowering programs would have
been enterprises run by Africans with local resources to address problems
associated with rural powerlessness. Outsiders are certainly an important
element of Africa's problems and solutions to its crises, but care needs
to be taken not to present them as "saviors"; entities as diverse as the
World Bank and European missionaries have claimed that mantle to no
avail.
The strategies deployed by NGOs pose other problems. Human rights
NGOs, especially in the West, often see themselves as modern-day
abolitionists whose purpose is to spotlight an evil and advocate its
eradication. Choices are cast in sharp relief, with no middle ground or
moral dilemma. The human rights movement's reliance on moral outrage
as a mobilizing technique requires moral certainty about the "bad" that
the "good" of the movement must overcome. Perhaps in no other example
does Welch bring this conflict out more clearly than in his discussion of
women's rights and genital operations on women.7" He focuses on the
work of the Inter-African Committee on Traditional Practices Affecting
the Health of Women and Children (IAC), a Geneva-based group that
seeks the elimination of harmful practices such as genital operations.
The IAC is the animating force behind a collection of national
committees and international agencies that work to combat genital
surgeries in a number of African countries. Berhane Ras-Work, an
Ethiopian, has been its key figure. Initially, the IAC was formed as a
response to what some African women deemed paternalistic and racist
depictions of practices labeled female genital mutilation (FGM) by
Western feminists. Although African women and Western feminists both
74. See id. at 266-73.
75. Welch devotes one chapter to the use of education as a tool for long-term social change
in relation to "traditional" practices, women's rights and genital operations on women, and the
critical role that he carves out for education in combatting this practice. Id. at 88-106.
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opposed female genital operations, the two differed on the appropriate
terminology and the meanings that could be rendered by particular
descriptions.76 Fran Hosken, the American feminist, became notorious for
her searing, dramatic descriptions and pictorial depictions of the practice.77
Many Africans found her offensive and patronizing.78
Welch recognizes the educational work of IAC and that of Irene
Thomas, the Nigerian partner of IAC, but he creates the impression that
were it not for Hosken and her fellow Westerners the subject of genital
operations would have remained "hidden." The picture of an Africa
repressive, or ignorant, enough to "deliberately" inflict suffering on its
own women is perhaps the unwitting residue of Welch's otherwise
important discussion of a critical subject. Thus, while an abolitionist
approach is useful in rallying forces against abuses, it could be a
double-edged sword: human rights advocates should not leap with
missionary zeal across the treacherous cultural divide. Doing so may be
construed as an attempt to impose unwanted alien values on others, a
charge that could significantly blunt efforts to construct a universal human
rights corpus.
Welch tackles the strategy of empowerment in the context of the
explosive claims of the group right to self-determination. He concentrates
his attention on the volatile cases of the Ogoni in Nigeria, the Oromo of
Ethiopia, and Senegal's Casamance region.79 Welch traces the problem of
ethnic group rights to the haphazard chiseling of the colonial state out of
various pre-colonial nations, and he treats claims for autonomy regimes
or secession as a direct result of the cultural and political incoherence of
the African state. He does not, however, question the overall viability of
the post-colonial state. He states that "cut-throat competition for economic
and political power encourages persons to turn to the primordial sentiment
of kinship, ' 80 an assertion that incorrectly implies an African uniqueness
in addressing competing nationalist claims and sentiments. In treating
76. The characterization of genital operations has been the subject of much controversy.
Names for the practice range from female circumcision to genital mutilation. Some Africans
and non-white Western women have assailed the depictions of African women in literature and
other visual impressions of genital surgeries as racist, paternalistic, and culturally insensitive.
See, e.g., Hope Lewis, Between Irua and "Female Genital Mutilation": Feminist Human Rights
Discourse and the Cultural Divide, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (1995). For an African critique of
Western feminism, see Joseph Oloka-Onyango & Sylvia Tamale, "The Personal is Political,"
Or Why Women's Rights are Indeed Human Rights: An African Perspective on International
Feminism, 17 HuM. RTS. Q. 691 (1995).
77. See WELCH, supra note 5, at 92. Welch describes her as "a forthright American
crusader for women's rights who was well-informed." Id.
78. See id. at. 103-04.
79. Id. at 107-39.
80. Id. at 117.
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ethnically-based political groups as human rights organizations, Welch
breaks with traditional Western human rights approaches which have not
treated such groups as part of the human rights universe.8 Although his
examination is not one of the norm or the pertinent international law,
Welch "authenticates" the use of human rights norms to seek the resolu-
tion of competing ethnic-based claims within the post-colonial state.
In addition, each of the three cases addressed by Welch has a defining
characteristic that galvanized the specific people to coalesce demands for
autonomy or secession. For the Ogoni, who occupy an oil-rich area of
Nigeria, resentment for the ecological devastation of their lands and
environment by oil companies and an abusive, authoritarian government
rallied them against the state.82 The failure of the state to share oil
revenues with the Ogoni aggravated that contradiction and heightened the
demands for autonomy. The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni
Peoples (MOSOP), under the leadership of acclaimed author Ken
Saro-Wiwa, drew international support because of its able use of interna-
tional fora, the stature of Saro-Wiwa, Nigeria's pariah status, and the
international sympathy generated by the oil companies' abuse of the
environment. The government appeared determined to silence MOSOP and
end the threat it posed to the state and to the oil industry. In May 1994,
Saro-Wiwa and other MOSOP activists were arrested for the suspicious
murders of pro-government Ogoni leaders 83 and were executed eighteen
months later after a trial that international observers condemned as
unfair.84 Welch captures well the struggle by the Ogoni and the state's
intransigence although he does not bring out fully the government's
determination to terminate, by any means necessary, the MOSOP threat.
85
81. INGOs and Western human rights academics have not, as a general rule, treated
liberation movements such as the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa or the South
West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia as human rights groups despite the
fact that such groups have sought to vindicate the right to self-determination, which is in my
view the most fundamental of all human rights. They see such groups as "political" organiza-
tions and not human rights NGOs, which they believe should be "neutral," "apolitical," or
"non-partisan." To them a group is a human rights NGO only if it is not directly involved in
the contest for state power, does not seek to form government, is not directly linked to a
particular political party, and primarily uses human rights standards as a basis for its advocacy.
See STEINER, supra note 60, at 5-15, 61-76 (discussing the characteristics of human rights
NGOs). I do not think the hazy distinctions drawn by INGOs are helpful; they still leave open
why certain groups are not categorized as human rights NGOs.
82. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AFRICA, THE OGONI CRISIS: A CASE STUDY OF MILITARY
REPRESSION IN SOUTHEASTERN NIGERIA (1995).
83. Id. at 14.
84. Nigerian Executions Allow No Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1995, at A30.
85. See WELCH, supra note 5, at 111-16.
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Senegal has not been much better about dealing with autonomy claims
for the Casamance region . Its brutal suppression of the Diola, the domi-
nant people in the region, and the Mouvement D6mocratique des Forces
Casamangais (MDFC), their political organ, has shown the state's inflexi-
bility in addressing autonomy regimes for minorities or other groups
seeking a special status within the state.s6 The impulse of the African
post-colonial state has been to suppress demands for group autonomy even
in cases where high degrees of cultural and national consciousness defined
a people.
The post-Mengistu state in Ethiopia has, however, departed from open
hostility to the explicit recognition of nationality differences in the
reconstruction of the state. 7 Its new administrative regions are organized
by ethnicity, ostensibly transferring power to the local people. This
approach was necessitated by the policies of past regimes which sought
the destruction of other cultural heritages and their replacement with the
dominant Amhara language and tradition.88 As a result, the new Ethiopian
constitution provides that "every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia
has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to
secession." 9 This approach has proven unsatisfactory because the govern-
ment did not mean what it said. According to Keller:
Contrary to EPRDF's [ruling party] expectation, this new approach
to dealing with the national question did little to placate the yearn-
ings of the various nationality groups for their assumed rights to
self-determination. In fact, the initiative had the opposite effect,
broadening and deepening ethnic tensions.'
The Oromo, who constitute about half of Ethiopia's population, and
have traditionally been excluded from the political mainstream by the
Amhara and the Tigrayans, have in particular pushed for a separate state.
Keller again notes that:
Some among the Oromo, for example, had their expectations height-
ened that these reforms could eventually position the Oromo people
to declare their independence from Ethiopia. Elements of the OLF
had long hoped to establish the independent state of Oromia. How-
ever, it was clear that the EPRDF-led government intended regional
86. Id. at 124-30.
87. See Keller, supra note 56.
88. Id.
89. See ETH. CONST. art. 39(1), reprinted in HAGOS, supra note 56, at 304, 315.
90. Keller, supra note 56, at 135.
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autonomy to mean only within the context of a united Ethiopia -
a form of federalism.9'
Rather than honor its commitment to democratic reform and
self-determination for various groups, the government has instead
embarked on a policy of repressive rule to squelch all opposition to its
rule.92 Welch holds out hope that there is a middle ground between
MOSOP, the OLF, and the MFDC on the one hand, and their governments
on the other; he thinks their calls for self-determination amount to a
zero-sum game.93 Instead, he advocates "mutual accommodation, through
dividing or decentralizing power., 94 But how can powers be devolved in
an authoritarian, undemocratic state that seeks firm central control within
the unitary state or, in the case of Ethiopia, a state that hypocritically
"commits" itself to ethnic self-determination? Or Nigeria, with its false
"federal" structures? Perhaps the Ethiopian approach may offer some hope
if carried to its logical conclusion. As this author has argued previously,
the map of Africa must be redrawn by reconceptualizing the uses of the
group right to self-determination.95 Perhaps this approach may give
viability to the African state and arrest its demise - a situation, which
I see as inevitable under its current configuration.
CONCLUSION
Professor Welch's valuable work, although admittedly undertaken from
a "sympathetic" 96 perspective, addresses a very broad subject about which
there has been little scholarly writing. Few academics have devoted time
to the study of the phenomenon of human rights NGOs in Africa. In this
respect, it will have a lasting impact as the first major work in the area.
But it is precisely for those reasons that Protecting Human Rights in
Africa will be subjected to close scrutiny. As I have sought to emphasize
in this review, the field of human rights in Africa is strewn with political
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ETHIOPIA - ACCOUNTABILITY PAST AND PRESENT:
HUMAN RIGHTS IN TRANSITION (1995). The government of Ethiopia has engaged in the focused
persecution of the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO), arguably the most independent
human rights NGO in the country, and its leader, Mesfin Wolde Mariam. See WELCH, supra
note 5, at 217-18; see generally DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 1994 (1995).
93. See WELCH, supra note 5, at 131.
94. Id.
95. Mutua, Redraw the Map, supra note 7.
96. WELCH, supra note 5, at xi.
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mines; the human rights movement's agenda is a complex package. Given
the continent's history of bombardment by various types of dominant
ideologies, it is essential that the movement be probed more critically than
Welch does.
The deployment and manipulation of human rights norms and images
by Africans or by outsiders in Africa must be sobered by the realization
that the human rights corpus seeks to vindicate, visions of a particular
political society. Even if the argument, which I advance, that human rights
law requires the reconstruction of societies to reflect versions of liberal
democracy is accepted, the precise nature of that political democracy still
remains an open question. Africans must be exposed to these dilemmas
as they choose, to use, or to reject, the human rights idiom as the midwife
for a new society. They must also choose how values from the
pre-colonial past fit into a scheme for liberating their societies within this
idiom, an issue Welch does not address.97 The human rights crusade
should not be presented, as I think Welch does, as a civilizing mission,
a project to replace offensive norms and debilitating cultural practices with
"humane" values. If human rights are pursued as a campaign of tutelage
- in which Africans are little more than robots - its redeeming quality
will be lost.
Domestic human rights organizations, which are vital for Africa,
cannot continue to be isolated outposts for the spread of Western liberal
values. They must not be animated primarily by the abolitionist impulse;
they must become an integral part of the cultural fabric -of African
societies and take the lead in the reformulation of the human rights corpus
to make it a tool in the reconstruction of a viable African state.
98
97. For the pre-colonial ideals relevant for the reformulation of the human rights corpus
to make it relevant to Africa, see Mutua, Cultural Fingerprint, supra note 4; see also Josiah
Cobbah, African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An African Perspective, 9 Hum. RTS.
Q. 309 (1987).
98. See generally Mutua, Cultural Fingerprint, supra note 4.
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